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ABSTRACT
The objectives of this essay are two-fold. First, it
will review the very real threat an avian influenza
pandemic poses to local communities. Second, it will
identify several unaddressed but critical concerns that
require the attention of local governments as they
refine their pandemic preparedness planning. It is
concluded that greater coordination with the private
sector, improved public health surveillance efforts,
planning for public education, and greater attention
to ethical issues are essential concerns that should be
on the agenda of local governments as they proceed
with their preparations.
Key words: avian flu, influenza pandemic, public
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INTRODUCTION
For over a decade, world health experts have been
monitoring and warning about a new and severe
influenza virus. This virus, the H5N1 strain, is known
more commonly as avian influenza or the bird flu.
Since 2003, this virus has caused the largest world-
wide poultry outbreak ever recorded. It first infected
humans in 1997 in Hong Kong and, as has been well-
reported, holds the potential to mutate into a very
deadly threat to humans once a fully contagious virus
emerges and becomes transmittable from human to
human.
Local governments will be on the front lines dur-
ing an avian influenza pandemic just as they are with
respect to regularly occurring natural disasters. The
response of local governments to such a pandemic will
be critical for the well-being of communities, busi-
nesses, and citizens. Comprehensive emergency
response plans are being prepared across the nation
for this potential national health emergency.
The purpose of this essay is two-fold. First, it will
articulate the threat posed by an avian influenza pan-
demic to every community. Second, it will provide an
overview of several major concerns that have
emerged as state and local governments have worked
to develop pandemic preparedness plans. An aware-
ness of these important concerns will be of great
importance as state and local officials, including pub-
lic health and emergency management officials,
refine their plans.
UNDERSTANDING THE AVIAN FLU PANDEMIC THREAT
The threat of an influenza pandemic has stirred
governmental concern and action at all levels. The
Department of Homeland Security has developed a
national strategy to guide state and local govern-
ments, as well as the private sector and individual cit-
izens, in preparing for the most serious flu pandemic
in almost 100 years.1 The national strategy calls for
the implementation of over 300 actions by federal
departments and agencies and communicates expec-
tations for nonfederal entities (state and local govern-
ments, the private sector, critical infrastructure, and
individual citizens, etc). An assessment of the threat
posed by an avian flu pandemic makes it clear that
such preparations are an urgent necessity.
Since December of 2003, the H5N1 virus has
caused the largest worldwide poultry outbreak ever
recorded. Sixty-five countries have experienced ani-
mal outbreaks, including 27 that were newly added in
2007. From 2003 to mid-2008, 14 countries have expe-
rienced confirmed human cases of H5N1 (382 with
241 deaths or a death rate of 63 percent). Human to
human transmission may have already occurred in
Indonesia which has experienced the largest number
of human cases (133) and a death rate of 81 percent.2
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Most experts believe that an avian flu pandemic
is highly probable. This expert consensus is increas-
ingly shared within the medical community at large.
A majority of US doctors have now come to believe
that a global influenza pandemic will arrive within
the next several years.3 This is not to imply they believe
we are prepared for such a pandemic. In a worst case
scenario, it could result in anywhere between 5 and
500 million human deaths worldwide.3 The World
Health Organization more conservatively estimates
1.9-7.5 million deaths.4 Fatality rates will vary accord-
ing to the resources that national health institutions
have in place, but the impact will be truly global. It
is important to note that, in a full-fledged pandemic,
the disease will spread rapidly effecting entire nations
at once.
Some perspective on the looming avian influenza
pandemic may be gained from the last major influenza
pandemic of this magnitude, the Spanish flu of 1918.
The 1918 pandemic resulted in 30 million deaths world-
wide and more than half a million American deaths. It
killed about 10 times more Americans than did World
War I. This pandemic was said to have killed more peo-
ple in less time than any disease before or after.5 By late
August of 1918, the flu had mutated and an epidemic of
unprecedented virulence exploded within a one week
period effecting port cities around the world.6 The
Spanish influenza moved swiftly across the United
States following the railroads and propagated fastest in
localities closest to them.6 With the frequency and ease
of international air travel today, the avian flu will
spread all the more rapidly and completely.
As our efforts across the United States to prepare
for a pandemic are underway, there are doubters to be
sure. This is, unfortunately, not unprecedented in pan-
demic situations. As the Spanish flu spread across the
United States in 1918, public officials and health offi-
cials were cautious, skeptical, poorly informed, and
unprepared.5 The Journal of the American Medical
Association, for example, opined that the Spanish flu
“should not cause greater importance to be attached to
it, nor arouse any greater fear than would influenza
without the new name.”7 Neither public health offi-
cials nor physicians were prepared and they had to
undergo heavy doses of pandemic exposure before
they understood the nature and the impact of the
Spanish influenza.5 The government and the
American people ignored the Spanish flu to an alarm-
ing extent. Politicians were absorbed in a World War,
as was the media, and the nation was ill-prepared to
say the least. The good news is that the current pan-
demic threat has received governmental attention
across the globe. But important concerns still persist.
Since 1918, despite many of its painful lessons, our
capacity to anticipate and prepare for new and novel
diseases has not improved to the extent that one might
hope. Most recent new diseases, Hantavirus and West
Nile fever to name just two, were well-established
months or even decades before they appeared in num-
bers large enough to be identified.8 Part of the problem
is that public health surveillance of the human and
animal populations has not improved sufficiently to
learn what is in fact knowable in advance. Consequently,
we remain highly vulnerable to the inadvertent expo-
sure to higher risk for serious new diseases, including
and especially newly evolved strains of adapted avian
influenza in humans.8
A pandemic today such as the one being antici-
pated for the H5N1 virus could actually be many
times more serious than the Spanish influenza pan-
demic of 1918. In 1918, we were a more self-sufficient
nation. In today’s corporate and free trade environ-
ment, just in time inventory management and global
supply chains are the norm.5 In light of this, economic
analysts are predicting an unprecedented global eco-
nomic collapse in the case of a full-blown worldwide
pandemic of the sort being projected for H5N1. This
could lead, in light of predicted 40 percent work
absentee rates, to a complete breakdown of the supply
chain, and unprecedented human suffering on a
global scale.5
As the preparations for an avian influenza pan-
demic have begun in earnest in the United States,
there have emerged several very important concerns
or issues that state and local planning entities must
confront as they move forward. Although progress has
been made in preparing local communities, this
progress has been uneven across the country.5 More
importantly, as the planning process has unfolded,
there are several unresolved challenges that have
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been identified and that will need to be addressed. It
is to a discussion of these critical concerns that we
now turn our attention.
PLANNING SHORTFALLS: CONCERNS TO BE ADDRESSED
As states and local communities are preparing for
a possible avian influenza pandemic, a close look at
these preparations finds wide differences in how far
along the planning has proceeded and little consensus
about the best policies and strategies.9 Among busi-
nesses, the effectiveness of planning and the quality
of the relationships necessary for the implementation
of these plans remains an open question.10 A majority
of the global corporations either have in place or are
preparing detailed avian flu pandemic plans. Small
businesses represent a special concern. A majority of
these small businesses or companies have not yet
begun to plan and, as such, are among the organiza-
tions most vulnerable in the event of a pandemic.
Whether they have planned or not, one major concern
that has arisen is that businesses of all sizes report a
virtual absence of coordination with the public sector.
More than 90 percent report that they have not had
discussions with any level of government. Few have
had some discussion about their organization’s ability
to provide essential services or access to facilities,
equipment, or staff during a pandemic.10 It should
certainly be a priority among local governmental
emergency planners and public health officials to pro-
mote better coordination between the public and pri-
vate sectors.
Agricultural communities may have particular
needs in relation to animal husbandry practices (i.e.
factory farming) that may increase the likelihood of a
pandemic. The methods of mass production associated
with the poultry industry, for example, and the prac-
tice of keeping large numbers of animals in close prox-
imity only increases the opportunity for transmission
of disease. The monitoring of bird and animal popula-
tions for signs of the H5N1 virus is a critical public
health surveillance function that must be improved.
Likewise, meat packing and poultry storage facilities
should be more carefully monitored for signs of dis-
ease. Improved public coordination with these entities
is essential.3,11 The best chance, any community has,
to control a pandemic consists of recognizing it as
early as possible. To whatever extent possible, the col-
laboration of public health, the medical community,
agriculture, and business must be geared to improved
surveillance of the animal and human populations for
signs of the H5N1 virus.
The collaboration necessary for improving the
early warning system and containing or delaying the
spread of the disease at its source will be difficult and
local communities cannot really be expected to pro-
duce it on their own initiative. Animal disease surveil-
lance, for example, is a state-based responsibility and
most animal health professionals cite the need to
improve surveillance for animal diseases. Most states
have laws requiring the reporting or monitoring of
animal diseases, and these must be certain to include
the possibility of H5N1 outbreaks in the animal pop-
ulation. Animal health information systems exist and
need to be improved. States must expand their capac-
ity to provide more leadership for local communities.12
Public health surveillance of the human popula-
tion, necessary to provide early warning and informa-
tion to decision makers, requires the systematic col-
lection, analysis, and interpretation of data. A global
epidemic especially calls for an integrated worldwide
network that brings health practitioners, researchers,
governments together across national boundaries.
Local communities cannot be responsible for that. But
national and state entities can and should do more to
bring local communities into an integrated disease
surveillance and response strategy. Here too, states
must expand their capacity to provide more leader-
ship for local communities.13 Local communities can
nevertheless benefit by incorporating into their plan-
ning an awareness of state and federal efforts in the
surveillance of human and animal populations.
Likewise, entities like the Center for Disease Control
and the World Health Organization provide much
useful information and analysis with respect to public
health surveillance.
Proper vaccination of a population is the most
reliable way to limit the impact of an H5N1 pandemic.
Most local plans include the designation of public
health treatment centers and the points of distribu-
tion for vaccines and antiviral medications. But the
bird flu pandemic will likely emerge and engulf com-
munities before an effective vaccine is produced, and
there will be inevitable shortages of vaccines when
they are produced as well as shortages of antiviral
medications.11 In the short-term, available influenza
medications such as Tamiflu will be recommended
and will prove helpful in treating symptoms some-
what.2 But that may offer little comfort in the end.
The United States as recently as 2 years ago had only
enough Tamiflu stockpiled to cover about 2 percent of
the population.5 Serious efforts, at both the national
and the state level, are underway to improve this sit-
uation. But even in a best case scenario, shortages of
antiviral medications must be anticipated.5
The question of who will receive the available
medications, and what will surely be a limited supply
of new vaccine when it is available, is one addressed
in most local plans. They have followed the suggestion
of the World Health Organization that priority for the
distribution of limited medications be first given to
“essential personnel.”5 Most plans identify essential
personnel. Medical personnel, pubic health and emer-
gency responders, police, fire fighters, and critical
infrastructure personnel are usually among their
number. Many are suggesting the inclusion of work-
ers in the transportation industry responsible for the
delivery of foods and medicines. Interestingly, and
perhaps ominously, Australia places funeral directors
among those first in line.5 Most importantly, critical
personnel aside, it is likely that the general American
public is going to be left without much medical protec-
tion at the onset of a pandemic. This leads directly to
another important concern that has received relative
little consistent attention.
In the expected absence of sufficient medical pro-
tection (i.e. shortages of vaccines and antiviral med-
ications as well as the overcrowding of hospitals etc.)
for its citizens, local planners are expected to include
and employ defensive strategies as the pandemic
threat level rises. These include social distancing, res-
piratory etiquette, and other hygiene measures.
School closures, public gathering bans, and travel
restrictions may be required to slow the course of a
full-fledged pandemic and are being anticipated by
most local planners.5 But such measures may be of
limited utility in a pandemic wave that sweeps in
quickly. It is possible that a community will be in the
midst of a pandemic before such measures can be
implemented and, given the expected shortages of
medical interventions and vaccines, most individuals
and families will be expected to arrange for their own
safety. This makes risk communication and pubic
education perhaps the most important ingredient in
local planning activities across the country.
Communicating the risks associated with an
H5N1 pandemic and educating the public about
appropriate and necessary self-defense measures to
mitigate these risks must be an essential component
in all pandemic planning. The American Public
Health Association conducted a recent survey. Its
results show that too many Americans are generally
unprepared for any public health emergency. Only
about 14 percent have the three day supply of food,
water, and emergency supplies recommended by the
American Red Cross. Thirty-two percent have taken
no action whatsoever to prepare for a public health
emergency. Eighty-seven percent admit they have not
done nearly enough to prepare for such an emer-
gency.14 In another striking finding, only 37 percent of
employers believed that a public health crisis would
impact their business over the next several years.
Regional food distribution centers reported spending
considerable time and resources on preparedness
planning, but local pantries and food shelves indi-
cated that they had not prepared.14 These results
seem to suggest that the task of preparing the public
to take defensive measures and make preparations
for an avian flu pandemic could be very daunting
indeed.
Social scientists have been studying people’s
responses to risk and to risk communication for
decades. The possibility for a scientifically sound pan-
demic risk communication and public education
strategy exists but has, unfortunately, been largely
underdeveloped.15 Recipes for failure in this area are
plentiful, and local communities must create and
implement a process that requires coordination
among several types of experts. These include subject
matter specialists (e.g. public health, social services,
law, emergency management planners and responders,
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and education), risk and decision analysts who can
identify information critical to the decisions of vari-
ous audiences, psychologists who can design mes-
sages and evaluate their success, and communica-
tions systems specialists who can ensure that tested
messages get communicated within the emergency
response system.15 It is probably safe to insist that we
may not in any sense be considered to be prepared for
a pandemic until the scientific base for creating and
delivering such communication is incorporated and
implemented in our local communities.
A final concern that has emerged as the planning
process has evolved in local communities, one that is
certainly alluded to in much of our preceding discus-
sion, touches on the ethical dimension of the pan-
demic threat. The allocation of scarce medical sup-
plies and resources, for example, or the application of
control measures during a pandemic are perceived as
ethical issues by most local planners. In a recent
study, scholars conducted a content analysis of exist-
ing state influenza pandemic plans seeking to iden-
tify evidence of ethical guidance as measured by the
presence of ethical language and ethical analysis or
discussion.16 The most striking finding was the rela-
tive absence of ethical language and direction.
When a pandemic wave is spreading across com-
munities around the nation, there will be little time
to discuss or reflect on ethical concerns, much less to
adjust public health, medical, and response systems
to enable them to act ethically or make ethical deci-
sions. Some ethical issues, such as those associated
with the allocation of scarce resources or the con-
straints on civil liberties imposed by various control
measures, are alluded to but hardly fleshed out. Most
mentioned, but not resolved, is the ethical signifi-
cance of shortages in supplies of antiviral agents and
vaccines.16 Clearly needed, at a minimum, is the enu-
meration of ethical decisions that can be anticipated
in advance, the devising of structures and systems for
ethical deliberation and decision making, training for
people who work in those systems, and a serious
effort to address ethical issues that can (and should)
be handled before a pandemic hits.16
The ethical dimensions of a pandemic scenario
may speak of the need to include trained ethicists as
a part of state and local planning units in an effort to
flesh out ethical issues, identify options, and decide in
advance how to respond ethically to an unfolding pan-
demic. Such expertise may be difficult for some com-
munities to access, but the utilization of such expert-
ise available at regional and local universities may
provide options for many if not most.
CONCLUSION
As state and local governments have begun plan-
ning for an avian influenza pandemic, their focus on
specific and technical response measures has resulted
in progress. In our discussion, four major concerns
have been identified and should be more seriously
engaged as planning moves forward. These concerns
may be thought of as a guide for the completion and
refinement of the planning process.
Concern number one: Coordination with the 
private sector
Among businesses or major corporations that
have engaged in serious planning, we have seen that
the vast majority have not interfaced with local gov-
ernments. Most small businesses have not begun to
plan at all. It is, therefore, imperative that local gov-
ernments initiate coordinated efforts with the private
sector. In the case of larger businesses, partnering
with them to utilize their efforts and resources com-
bined with public efforts and resources can provide
essential additional services and facilities to commu-
nities and their citizens. Equally important, local
planning groups need to reach out to small businesses
and offer information and assistance to ignite their
preparedness activity.
Concern number two: Monitoring
The best chance to control for the effects of an
avian influenza pandemic is to recognize it as early as
possible. Much room for improvement exists here. In
addition to coordinating with the medical community
to monitor human populations and identify avian
influenza cases, agricultural communities especially
will want to consider increased efforts to monitor bird
and animal populations for signs of H5N1 outbreaks.
Meat packing and poultry storage facilities will
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require special monitoring as well. The planning
process should include, to the extent possible, plans
for the collaboration of the appropriate public and pri-
vate sector actors to improve all public health surveil-
lance efforts. This includes the development of joint
strategy, the training of appropriate actors, and the
processing and sharing of relevant information.
Concern number three: Risk communication and
public education
The degree to which individuals, families, and
communities will be left on their own during a pan-
demic, combined with the expected shortages of
antiviral medication and vaccines at the onset of a
pandemic, make risk communication and public edu-
cation extremely important in relation to mitigation
efforts that citizens will need to be prepared to take
in self-defense. This public education function, as we
have seen, will require the utilization of both scien-
tific techniques in risk communication and of special-
ists who are able to employ them effectively. This
should be a major priority for all local planning
groups. It is critical that the public be properly edu-
cated with respect to precautions and defensive meas-
ures as well as with respect to treatment options.
Equally important is the process for keeping the pub-
lic informed through the course of a pandemic event
or wave once it begins.
Concern number four: Anticipate ethical dilemmas
Given the earlier discussion of the ethical dimen-
sion of an avian influenza pandemic, and the sparse
attention addressed to it in local planning to date, it is
essential that ethical concerns be anticipated and
explicitly addressed in the planning process. The inclu-
sion of a trained ethicist in local planning units is
strongly suggested. It is worth noting that ethical deci-
sion making is more likely to occur when it is decided in
advance. During a pandemic wave, if ethical concerns
have not been anticipated and prepared for, response
efforts may well be faced with a series of tragic choices
in which ethical outcomes are difficult if not impossible
to achieve.
Robert O. Schneider, PhD, Department of Political Science and Public
Administration, University of North Carolina at Pembroke, Pembroke,
North Carolina.
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